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Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 
78A-4-103(h). 
Issues Presented For Review 
1. Did the trial court err when it used Mr. McPherson's gross income to 
determine his ability to pay alimony? 
Standard of Review: "We will review the trial court's decisions regarding child 
support and alimony under the abuse of discretion standard." Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT 
App29l,1J9, 169P.3d754. 
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved in Mr. McPherson's Second 
Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R.396-403). 
2. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion when it refused to 
retroactively modify Mr. McPherson's alimony and child support obligations pursuant to 
Utah Code section 78B-12-112(4)? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision relating to retroactive amendment of 
support obligations is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Wilde v. Wilde, 
2001 UT App 318,1(27, 35 P.3d 34.1. 
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved in Mr. McPherson's Motion to 
Amend Temporary Orders. (R.92-96). 
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Statement of the Case 
This case is a divorce action between the parties. The action was filed on 
September 2, 2009 and a trial was held on June 25 and 30, 2010. The trial court entered a 
final order on September 28, 2010. 
Statement of Facts 
1. On October 30, 2010, the commissioner recommended that Mr. McPherson 
pay temporary child support in the amount of $1,965 per month and temporary alimony in 
the amount of $2,425 per month. These figures were based on Mr. McPherson's income 
of approximately $175,000 per year. This recommendation was signed by the trial court 
on November 30, 2009. (R.76-78). 
2. On November 25, 2009, Mr. McPherson was terminated from his position 
on which the temporary awards were based. (R.346). 
3. Mr. McPherson subsequently began working as a diesel mechanic grossing 
$4,680 per month which equates to $56,160 per year. (R.347). 
4. On December 14, 2009, Mr. McPherson filed a Motion to Amend 
Temporary Orders requesting that his support obligations be modified based on his 
significantly reduced income. (R.92-96). 
5. This request was denied based on Mrs. McPherson's allegation that Mr 
McPherson was voluntarily underemployed and Mr. McPherson was ordered to invade up 
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to one-half of his 401(k) plan to continue meeting the existing support obligations. 
(R.112). 
6. On June 25 and June 30, 2010, a bench trial was held in this matter before 
the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck. (R.341). 
7. The trial court found that Mr. McPherson was not voluntarily 
underemployed and did not intentionally get terminated from his higher paying position to 
avoid his alimony and child support obligations. (R.352). 
8. Following trial, Mr. McPherson's child support obligation was set pursuant 
to the statutory tables ($851 per month) and alimony was set at $900 per month based on 
Mr. McPherson's gross monthly income of $4,680. (R.363). 
9. The trial court further found that Mr. McPherson's monthly expenses were 
$3,155 per month. (R.356). 
10. The trial court further found that there was no basis to retroactively modify 
Mr. McPherson's support obligations and entered judgment against him in the amount of 
$9,641 due to past due support obligations. (R.358). 
11. On July 7, 2010, Mr. McPherson filed a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law due to the trial court's failure to consider Mr. McPherson's 
ability to pay the alimony award. (R.366-76). 
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12. On August 4, 2010, the trial court acknowledged a mathematical error and 
reduced Mr. McPherson's alimony obligation to $800 per month based on his gross 
monthly income of $4,680. (R.390-91). 
13. In the August 4, 2010 Ruling, the trial arbitrarily reduced Mr. McPherson's 
reasonable monthly expenses to $2,955 per month in order to make its math work 
regarding the alimony obligation. (R.390-91). 
14. Using Mr. McPherson's gross monthly income of $4,680 per month and 
subtracting his child support of $851 and monthly expenses of $2,955, the trial court 
found that Mr. McPherson had the ability to pay alimony in the amount of $800. (R.391). 
15. On August 10, 2010, Mr. McPherson filed a Second Motion to Amend 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for the reason that the trial court calculated Mr. 
McPherson's ability to pay alimony on his gross income, rather than his net income as 
required by law. (R.396-98). 
16. On September 27, 2010, the trial court denied the second motion to amend 
without explanation. (R.438). 
Summary of Arguments 
Utah law requires a trial court to consider an obligor's net income when 
determining whether they have the ability to pay alimony. In this case, the trial court 
based its alimony award on Mr. McPherson's gross income which left him unable to meet 
his own monthly expenses as found by the trial court. 
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Utah Code section 78B-12-112 provides that a child or spousal support order may 
be modified retroactively to the month following service of a motion to modify. In this 
case, the trial court refused to retroactively modify Mr. McPherson5s support obligation 
even though it found that he was not voluntarily underemployed or attempting to avoid 
his support obligations. The result is that the trial court entered a $9,641 judgment 
against Mr. McPherson for past due support obligations that were based on income that 
does not exist, which is an abuse of discretion. 
Argument 
I. The Trial Court Committed an Abuse of Discretion When it Based Mr. 
Mcpherson's Alimony Obligations on His Gross Monthly Income. 
The alimony award entered in this case was based on a "clear and prejudicial abuse 
of discretion" and must be vacated. Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (citation omitted). In its August 4, 2010 Ruling and Order, the trial court 
erroneously used Mr. McPherson5s gross income to determine his ability to pay alimony. 
The rule is that a trial court must consider after tax, net income when calculating whether 
an obligor has the ability to pay alimony. See Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ^ J18, 
169 P.3d 754 (reversing trial court that did not enter adequate findings to show proper 
consideration of obligor's net income). 
In its initial Ruling and Order, the trial court determined that Mr. McPherson 
should pay $900 per month in alimony but entered no findings as to how Mr. McPherson 
could pay such an award. See Memorandum Decision, R. 341-365, a copy of which is 
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attached hereto as Addendum Ex. 1 and incorporated herein by this reference. When this 
omission was brought to the trial court's attention, it replied "Respondent is certainly 
correct. The court did not specifically find that respondent could pay $900 per month 
given his expenses though that was clearly inherent in the court's findings and 
discussion." Ruling and Order, R.389-393, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addendum Ex. 2 and incorporated herein by this reference. 
The trial court then proceeded to enter specific figures in an attempt to justify the 
amount of alimony it awarded Mrs. McPherson. First, the trial court arbitrarily reduced 
Mr. McPherson's reasonably monthly expenses to $2,955. See Addendum Ex. 2 (R.391). 
The trial court offered no rationale as to why it amended its prior finding and it is 
apparent that the only reason for the arbitrary change is to try and get the math to work. 
The lack of foundation for this conclusion alone should cause it to be vacated1. The trial 
court then took Mr. McPherson's gross monthly income of $4,680, subtracted his child 
support obligation of $851 and his newly found monthly expenses of $2,955 and 
determined that left him with more than $800 with which to pay alimony. See Addendum 
Ex. 2 (R.391). 
*The trial court must "include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT 
App 41, U 10, 974 P.2d 306 (citing Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
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The problem is that the trial court's calculation only works if Mr. McPherson 
actually nets $4,680 per month, which he does not. After taxes, Mr. McPherson's net 
income is approximately $3,270 per month. See Respondent's Trial Exhibit 101. After 
subtracting Mr. McPherson's child support obligation of $851 per month and his 
reasonable monthly expenses of $2,955, Mr. McPherson is in the negative $536 per 
month. 
In fashioning an alimony award, the trial court was required to address whether 
Mr. McPherson will be left with sufficient funds to pay for his reasonable living 
expenses. See Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), n.l (" the payor 
spouse's reasonable needs are a necessary subsidiary step in determining the ability to 
provide support") (citation omitted). It is apparent from the trial court's findings that Mr. 
McPherson cannot meet his own monthly expenses, let alone pay an additional amount as 
alimony to Mrs. McPherson. 
The trial court's alimony award leaves Mr. McPherson with approximately $1,500 
per month after child support. This is insufficient to cover rent ($1,300) and food ($400) 
as found by the trial court. The trial court's findings regarding alimony "must show that 
the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence." 
Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, f 18 (citing Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988)). The trial court's findings do not logically follow the evidence and the 
alimony award should be eliminated as Mr. McPherson has no ability to pay. 
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II. The Trial Court Committed an Abuse of Discretion by Refusing to 
Retroactively Modify Mr. McPherson's Support Obligations. 
Utah Code section 78B-12-112 provides that a child or spousal support order may 
be modified retroactively to the month following service of a motion to modify. Mrs. 
McPherson was served with Mr. McPherson's motion to modify on December 14, 2009 
and therefore, the support obligations should have been amended retroactively to January 
1,2010. (R.92-94). 
The trial court based its refusal to retroactively modify the support obligations on 
the commissioner's judgment call that Mr. McPherson's termination "appeared to be 
'self-inflicted' and 'purposeful.'" See Addendum Ex. 1 (R.358). Once evidence was 
heard however, the trial court found that the commissioner's determination was incorrect. 
Because of this, there is no basis on which to sustain the commissioner's temporary award 
and the support obligations should have been modified retroactively. 
The trial court's refusal to do so resulted in a $4,390 per month support obligation 
on an obligor who only grosses $4,680. Moreover, the temporary support award was 
based on a set of facts and assumptions that have been proven to be wrong. This is 
simply impermissible. As set forth above, alimony must be based on an obligor's ability 
to pay which did not exist. Moreover, child support is required to be calculated pursuant 
to actual income, not an incorrect assumption of income. See Utah Code Ann. 
§78B-12-205. 
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Not only did the trial court refuse to retroactively amend the support obligations, it 
penalized Mr. McPherson further by entering judgment in the amount of $9,641 for 
unpaid arrears. (R.358). Between January 1, 2010 and the date of trial, Mr. McPherson 
paid $16,699 to Mrs. McPherson in temporary support. This amount is far in excess of 
the $9,906 that he should have paid even if the conclusions and calculations of the trial 
court were accepted as correct.2 
In addition to the prejudice suffered by Mr. McPherson due to the grossly inflated 
support obligation, he was further prejudiced by only receiving one quarter of his 
retirement account. Mr. McPherson was ordered to invade up to one-half of his 401(k) to 
meet the temporary support obligations. (R.213). Mr. McPherson did so and this amount 
was paid to Mrs. McPherson. At trial, the court then awarded Mr. McPherson one-half of 
what was left in his 401(k) which was approximately twenty five percent of the amount 
he should have received. 
As a result of the trial court's abuse of discretion, Mrs. McPherson has been 
garnishing 50% of Mr. McPherson's income which has left him financially destitute. The 
general purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from becoming a public 
charge. This policy should run both ways and the courts should be cognizant not to cause 
the obligor to become a public charge, which is on the verge of happening in this matter. 
2These calculations were based on the $4,390 temporary support obligation versus the 
$1,651 permanent support obligation entered by the trial court, from January 1, 2010 through 
trial. 
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In sum, the trial court's refusal to retroactively amend Mr. McPherson's support 
obligations constitutes a reversible abuse of discretion. Again, the trial court's judgment 
is not supported by, nor does it follow logically, from the evidence. Once the trial court 
determined that the assumptions on which the temporary support was based were 
incorrect, it should have vacated the temporary award. Mr. McPherson should have 
received a credit/judgment for all alimony and any excess child support that he made from 
service of the motion to modify until trial. 
Conclusion 
The trial court committed an abuse of discretion by failing to consider Mr. 
McPhersons's net income when determining his ability to pay alimony. Because Mr. 
McPherson has no ability to pay alimony based on the findings of the trial court, the 
award should be eliminated in its entirety. Further, the trial court committed an abuse of 
discretion by refusing to retroactively modify the temporary support obligations that were 
based on incorrect assumptions. Because Mr. McPherson does not have the ability to pay 
any alimony award, he should receive a judgment against Mrs. McPherson for all alimony 
paid since January 1, 2010, along with any child support overpayments made between 
January 1, 2010 and entry of the trial court's final order. 
DATED this _ [ | l day of May, 2011. 
COHNK RAPPAPtjMp & SEGAL, P.C. 
X^ 
V' 
)shua K. Peterman 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 0fcffj*lt#£j£ ,. 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH % 
°e. 
CINDI R. 
vs. 
GORDON W 
MCPHERSON 
Petitioner, 
. MCPHERSON, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 094401941 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: July 1, 2010 
h 
The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on 
June 25 and 30, 2010. Petitioner was present with James H. 
Woodall and Respondent was present with Joshua K. Peterman. 
On the first day of trial the court heard only one witness 
and the case was postponed until June 30 at the request of 
petitioner. The eldest child of the parties had given birth 
prematurely the night before on June 24 and based thereon the 
court continued the trial a few days except for one witness who 
would not be available on June 30, 2010 and thus testified on 
June 25, 2010. 
BACKGROUND 
A complaint for divorce was filed September 25, 2009. It 
alleged the parties were married March 2, 1991. Two children 
were born of the marriage, Skye D. McPherson born October 12, 
1992 (age 17), and Zackary W. McPherson born April 14, 1994 (age 
16 at trial). Petitioner sought legal and physical custody, child 
support, and a division of property as well as alimony. 
Petitioner also sought temporary orders. 
Respondent on October 22, 2009, filed an answer and 
counterclaim. He sought joint legal and physical custody and 
submitted a parenting plan. He filed a counter motion for 
temporary orders. 
Petitioner also filed a parenting plan on October 26, 2010. 
The commissioner held a hearing on October 30, 2010, and 
recommended that petitioner be awarded the use of the marital 
residence, sole legal and physical custody of the children with 
liberal parent time for respondent. The parties were to respect 
the desires of the children. Respondent was to pay $1965 child 
support, $2425 in alimony and medical expenses were to be shared 
equally under the statute. Mediation was also ordered. The order 
was signed December 1, 2009. 
On December 10, 2009, petitioner moved for further orders. 
Respondent then sought to amend the temporary orders. 
A further hearing was held by the commissioner on January 
11, 2010. A recommendation was issued which required respondent 
to maintain the mortgage payment and respondent was allowed to 
access the 401(k) fund up to one half to maintain the obligations 
ordered. Issues certified for trial were the remaining 401(k) 
fund, a change to alimony and child support and the sale of the 
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marital residence. The original amounts of alimony and child 
support were to continue. An order was prepared, and there were 
objections by respondent. The order was signed March 12, 2010. An 
emergency hearing was held before the court on February 5, 2010, 
and the court ruled that the 401(k) fund be used for child 
support and another hearing was to be held before the 
commissioner. It was held February 26, 2010, and the original 
amounts of alimony and child support were reconfirmed. The order 
was signed April 29, 2010. 
On March 17, 2010. Respondent filed another motion to amend 
the temporary orders. 
Another hearing was conducted by the commissioner on March 
18, 2010 on petitioner's previously filed motion to bifurcate. It 
was granted and all other issues were reserved. That order was 
signed May 4, 2010. The bifurcated decree was entered May 6, 
2010. 
A hearing was held again by the commissioner on April 21, 
2010, on various motions of the parties. The commissioner 
recommended that an immediate trial occur, discovery could be re-
opened, the previous admissions were withdrawn, respondent was 
allowed beginning in May 2010 to pay the mortgage directly in 
lieu of alimony, the parties were required to attend at least one 
mediation session concerning the home sale, mortgage arrears were 
certified as was the issue of bringing current the mortgage 
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payments. The order was signed May 13, 2010. 
The pretrial order was signed May 18, 2010, certifying for 
trial the issues of alimony, child support, respondent's request 
for retroactive amendment since his employment change, allocation 
of 2009 and 2010 tax liabilities, the disposition of the marital 
home, division of retirement and respondent's claim that his 
support payments should be charged against petitioner's share of 
the retirement, whether respondent has become voluntarily 
underemployed, division of personal property and bank accounts, 
petitioner's claim of waste, respondent's claim of petitioner's 
failure to maintain the mortgage, and attorney fees. 
The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument 
of counsel, and is fully advised. The court took the matter under 
advisement. 
The court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court finds the background facts as above in the 
BACKGROUND section. 
2. The parties were married March 2, 1991. Two children 
were born of the marriage, Skye D. McPherson born October 12, 
1992 (age 17 at trial), and Zackary W. McPherson born April 14, 
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1994 (age 16). 
3. Irreconcilable differences arose which made the 
legitimate ends of a marriage impossible and each was awarded a 
dissolution of the marriage on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences on May 6, 2010. Other issues were reserved for this 
trial. 
4. This case seems to have at its heart whether respondent 
was terminated because of his job "voluntarily" such that the 
court should impute income higher than he is now actually 
earning. 
5. At the time of the marriage respondent was a diesel 
mechanic. His social security earning record shows that since 
the marriage his yearly medicare earnings were as follows: 
1991 $17,834 
1992 20,676 
1993 2,485 
1994 23,921 
1995 43,058 
1996 54,044 
1997 53,802 
1998 59,816 
1999 58,378 
2000 59,971 
2001 57,702 
-5-
2002 55,479 
2003 59,656 
2004 65,379 
2005 58,544 
2006 61,405 
2007 170,809 
2008 158,007 
2009 189,044 
6. As can be seen there was a dramatic increase in income in 
2007. At that time respondent became the Product Sales and 
Support Representative (PSSR) at Wheeler Machinery which caused 
his increase in salary. He had been a diesel mechanic at Wheeler 
for approximately 12 years before 2007. The PSSR job was a 
different job from being a mechanic. He was terminated from that 
job and Wheeler on November 25, 2009. The Termination Notice 
indicates that the reason was "violating our corporate 
expectations related to customer interaction. (Left a threatening 
voicemail)." The form was checked as an involuntary termination 
by respondent's supervisor. 
7. That termination is the key to the financial issues of 
this case, and thus this case itself really, as petitioner claims 
the court should thus impute income under UCA 78B-12-203(7) under 
the higher level of his most recent earnings from 2007-2009. 
Before the "promotion" in 2007, from the time of the marriage, 
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respondents average yearly income from 1991 through 2006 was 
$47,00 per year, or $3917 per month. This includes one 
particularly "low" year in 1993. From 2007 through 2009, three 
years, respondent earned an average of $172,620 per year, or 
$14,385 per month, almost four times what he had earned 
previously and what he is currently earning. Thus, the difference 
in monthly gross income in the first 16 years of marriage and in 
the last three years of the marriage is over $10,000 per month. 
Hence, this trial over this issue-should the court find 
respondent's income as he has earned during most of the marriage 
and currently, or what he earned in a three year period when he 
enjoyed a "promotion" and was doing a different job? 
8. If the court is to impute income the court must find 
respondent is underemployed. He currently earns $27.00 per hour 
as a diesel mechanic, which equates to $4680 gross income per 
month. Before the "promotion" in 2007 he was earning $23.00 per 
hour as a diesel mechanic. The court is to consider his 
abilities, whether his current salary is below the current market 
for such positions, current job openings, his work history, 
occupational qualifications, prevailing earnings of those with 
similar backgrounds and similar factors. UCA 78B-12-203(7). 
9. Here, obviously respondent has the "ability" to earn what 
he earned from 2007-2009, approximately $14,000 per month. That 
is obviously so because in fact he earned that amount, without 
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dispute. He has a high school education, is age 44, and is a 
certified diesel engine mechanic. He has worked on a farm, as a 
framer, and these jobs as a diesel mechanic and PSSR. Thus, the 
issue becomes whether the court should impute such a higher 
figure because he was terminated from that job "voluntarily," 
that is, because of his own conduct. 
10. Respondent was terminated after 15 years with the 
company, Wheeler Machinery in Salt Lake City, because he left a 
voice message on the telephone of a customer of Wheeler 
Machinery. 
11. Respondent was called a Product Sales and Service 
Representative (PSSR). In that capacity he had contact with 
customers both during and after traditional work periods of the 
day. Evidently he was involved in sales and a liaison between 
service and the customer in some ways not understood by the 
court. He had a customer in another part of Utah and had contact 
with a woman and a man in that other company. That woman is now 
respondent's cohabitant, and she is age 28. That man, a co-
worker with the woman, became protective of the woman and had 
sought to track or trace the movements of respondent relative to 
respondent's contacts with that woman, evidently believing that 
the woman and respondent were having some type of relationship of 
which that man did not approve. That suspicion was evidently 
correct, as noted, in that respondent and that woman now live 
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together. Based thereon, based on the conduct of the man which 
conduct respondent did not like, respondent left a voice message 
with that man which was threatening in tone. That man reported 
that voice message to his company, who reported it to 
respondent's Human Resource department at Wheeler. From there 
respondent's supervisor was informed and called in respondent. 
Respondent apologized and asked if he could remain with the 
company, Wheeler, but the supervisor issued the termination 
notice based on that conduct. Respondent was terminated outright 
from Wheeler for not abiding by company policy. 
12. The position respondent had paid a fairly low base 
salary (approximately $1000 per month) but most of the income was 
from commission. At the time (2007-2009) there were 3.5 such 
positions at Wheeler, PSSRs, in the division in which respondent 
worked. He was at the top of the income chart as to those 3.5 
PSSRs along with another in that division and in that position. 
Before termination Wheeler personnel had already been discussed 
with respondent and the other PSSRs that the commission structure 
was going to be modified so that such PSSRs would normally be 
expected to earn beginning in 2010 between $100,000-150,000, 
rather than the higher figures respondent had been earning, 
though there would not have been a "cap" on the upper earnings 
amount. The industry, especially that division ("power systems" 
in the heavy equipment industry), is down approximately 20% due 
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to its relationship to construction which is down under the 
general economy. 
13. The termination was in one sense "voluntary" in that 
respondent was terminated because of his own actions rather than 
a work force reduction, poor economy, closure of a business, or 
other reasons not associated with his conduct. The court does 
not believe simply that misdeeds at work justify a finding that 
the termination should result in an imputation of higher income. 
The court must determine, and find from facts, whether respondent 
decided to be terminated so he would not have to pay a higher 
level of alimony and/or child support, that is, so he could 
reduce his support payments or avoid those support obligations. 
Respondent's position at trial is indeed that he ought not to 
have to pay alimony and he has so asked and so informed 
petitioner that he would not pay alimony to petitioner. The 
court considers the actions of respondent before and after his 
firing, that he immediately sought another job in his more 
"historic" field of being a diesel mechanic, that he is now 
earning an hourly wage which is higher than the wage he earned as 
a diesel mechanic before 2007 and in an amount that JS above the 
average Utah diesel mechanic hourly wage, that he is working in 
his more historic field, as well as all the factors surrounding 
the termination. He obtained a job on December 14, 2009, within 
three weeks of termination. He continues to see if positions 
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similar to the Wheeler PSSR position are available. There was no 
evidence presented by either party as to the availability of such 
jobs with other companies, nor what they may pay, nor what 
qualifications are necessary for such higher paying jobs. It is 
clear to this court, and the court finds, respondent cannot go 
back to work for Wheeler. No evidence showed what respondent 
could earn elsewhere in similar jobs, or if there are similar 
jobs. Here, the statute at issue on imputation does not state 
that the court may only find underemployment if the court finds 
an intent to avoid or reduce support obligations. However, the 
purposes of the imputation statute seem to be the prevention of 
situations where a person seeks to avoid support obligations by 
simply reducing his income voluntarily. 
14. The court heard the testimony of the individuals 
involved in the termination, respondent and his then-supervisor 
who fired him. The court cannot find that respondent was 
terminated so that he would not have to pay a higher support 
amount. With his past "high" salary and commissions in 2007-
2009, even paying the temporary order amount of almost $4400 per 
month, respondent had more money to live on himself than he now 
has even if he paid no support to petitioner or to the children. 
While many people behave irrationally in divorces, and this court 
has indeed on occasion seen people purposefully quit or "lose" 
their job or income to avoid giving anything to the adverse 
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spouse, the court finds that even though this termination was the 
"fault" of respondent, and the timing is close to the temporary 
order issued, and respondent does not feel alimony should be 
paid, the court finds that the termination was NOT for the 
purpose of lowering payments to his children or lowering alimony 
payments to petitioner. He acted voluntarily in getting 
terminated, though it was not his intent to be fired nor halt 
paying petitioner. Respondent considered the voice mail a 
"personal" comment to the customer about respondent's 
relationships, and not about work related matters. Indeed, the 
voice message was not directly about work, but was about personal 
issues. Wheeler did not see it the same way but believed that 
because the man who was called was a Wheeler customer, respondent 
was wrong and violated company policy. He was thus terminated. 
The court finds respondent would be better off financially with 
the PSSR job, even with a reduced income which was anticipated to 
begin in 2010, and paying greater support, than he is currently. 
He still earns a good salary but compared to the three years 
2007-2009 of course it is less than one third that salary. 
15. The temporary order was entered in this case after a 
hearing on October 30, 2009, ordering respondent to pay $2425 per 
month as temporary alimony effective November 1, 2009, and 
temporary child support in the sum of $1965 per month, obviously 
based on respondent's earnings at that time. Thus, his total 
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obligation was $4390 per month. He was terminated November 25, 
2009. In December he sought to eliminate alimony and reduce 
child support. The court upheld the original order prior to trial 
after several requests to do otherwise, objections by respondent, 
and several hearings. 
16. Petitioner has worked during the marriage except for the 
time shortly after the birth of the two children. She has worked 
with Discover Card in collections and is now a team supervisor. 
She currently earns $19.63 per hour, working between 32-25 hours 
per week. Even though she works a bit less than full time, she 
could if she desired work 39 hours per week, though not 40 
evidently under Discover rules. Given the circumstances, the 
court must also impute that wage to her at that weekly rate as to 
the number of hours possible. Thus, at 39 hours per week, and 
$19.63 per month, r^ Bp^ uijjaut' s gross monthly income is $3317 per 
Wit 
month. 
17. Child support should be calculated using the figures of 
$4680 gross income per month for respondent and $3317 for 
petitioner, using the sole custody work sheet. It is payable 
under UCA 78B-12-112. 
18. Petitioner claims monthly expenses of $6525 for herself 
and the two children. The court is assuming that petitioner has 
sole custody of the two children, which custody is not now 
contested. The eldest child, who delivered a child (a grandchild 
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to these parties) the night before the scheduled trial date of 
June 25, 2010, will be age 18 in October of 2010 and graduate 
from high school in May or June 2011. The evidence did not 
reveal if that eldest child will be living with petitioner or on 
her own long term but that 17 year old "child" and the new 
grandchild since the birth on June 24, 2010, are living with 
petitioner currently since the birth of the grandchild. That 
child will be a senior in high school in the Fall of 2010 and the 
younger child will be a junior. Nevertheless, the court is forced 
to reduce as unreasonable the areas of food and supplies (reduced 
by $200), electricity (-50), natural gas (-50), cell phone (-50), 
cable tv (-50), school and sports (-100), entertainment (-100), 
gifts (-100), incidental (-50), and auto expense (-200). Those 
are reduced to what the court believes is reasonable given the 
incomes of the parties, as the standard of living during most of 
the marriage except the last three years of the marriage as 
discussed above and as of trial. Thus, the court reduces the 
claimed expenses by $950, finding the reasonable monthly expenses 
to be $5575, subject to the discussion below concerning the 
marital home. 
19. The marital home has a value of $340,000 based on an 
agreed appraisal occurring in November 2009. The mortgage balance 
is $358,000. The parties paid almost $430,000 for the home and 
have put in over $100,000 in basement and landscape improvements, 
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but it remains worth currently $340,000 and is marital property. 
The parties are obviously "upside down" and owe more than it is 
worth. The mortgage payments have not been made since December 
2009. Petitioner is trying to obtain a modified loan to remain 
in the home. Her monthly expenses currently include the current 
mortgage payment of $2577, which is not being paid and has not 
been paid by petitioner or respondent since December 2009. Thus, 
the court finds that it is most likely that the home will either 
suffer a short sale or be foreclosed, but in any event that 
mortgage payment will not continue to be made at the current 
figure under any of the possible outcomes. A lesser mortgage 
must obviously be obtained on this or another residence or as a 
rental payment. The court finds that even with two children 
under age 18 until April 2010, the mortgage payment cannot remain 
at the level it was when there were two incomes and one was over 
three times what it is now. The court will reduce the claimed 
expenses in the area of mortgage by $600, allowing a mortgage or 
rental payment of $2000 per month. In fact that is what 
petitioner testified would be the approximate payment on the 
mortgage IF the modification is approved, which at this point has 
not happened. Thus, the reasonable total monthly expenses of 
petitioner are $4975 after reducing the above areas and the 
mortgage payment, which in any event is not in fact being paid by 
anyone. 
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20. Respondent claims his reasonable monthly expenses are 
$4005. He does not have physical custody of the children. He is 
living with his new girlfriend in Vernal, Utah. The court reduces 
his claimed expenses in the area of food (-$200), cable tv(-50), 
cell phone (-50), entertainment (-50), incidentals (-100), and 
auto expense (-400) . Thus, the court reduces his expenses as 
being unreasonable under the circumstances and finds the 
reasonable monthly expenses of respondent to be $3155. 
21. As to alimony the court has considered the statutory and 
other factors concerning alimony, including the standard of 
living during the marriage both during the "'normal" years when 
respondent was a diesel mechanic and the "higher earning" years 
when he was a PSSR, what each party gave up for the marriage, 
what each brought into the marriage, the ages of the parties, 
their health, their ability and training and education, the 
duration of the marriage, the present income, how it was 
acquired, the children, the ages and obligations of the parties, 
the sacrifices, the standard of living, and fault. Principally 
the court considers the need of petitioner based largely on their 
standard of living at the time of trial and during 16 of the 19 
years of the marriage, her own ability to meet those needs, and 
the ability of respondent to make up that difference. The court 
is to attempt to provide the standard of living, as nearly as 
possible, as the parties enjoyed during the marriage and prevent 
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a party from becoming a public charge. "Fault" is of course 
difficult but in any event under Mark v. Mark, 223 P. 3d 476 (T 
App. 2009) fault is not considered much of a factor at this point 
or in this case. The statute allows the court to normally 
consider the standard of living at the time of separation, but 
the court may, if it finds otherwise, use a standard from another 
time. The court has done that here given the unusual earning 
history of respondent with 16 of 19 years being the more "true" 
standard of living. 
22. Thus, petitioner's needs are greater than respondent can 
help meet given the court's findings. This was a 19+ year 
marriage. Alimony is to continue terminable on the usual 
triggers. The court believes it is reasonable and fair that 
respondent pay to petitioner the sum of $900 per month alimony. 
Alimony is to be paid directly to petitioner half by the 5th and 
20th of each month beginning July 2010. This level of alimony 
does not meet the needs of petitioner but respondent is unable to 
pay more than that. This allows the parties to live 
approximately how they lived most of the marriage, but not during 
the atypical last three years of marriage. Given that the 
increased income was of a three year duration, the court finds it 
appropriate to consider the standard of living at the time of 
trial and for 16 of the 19 years of the marriage rather than the 
three year period of increased income at the time of separation, 
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23. The parties are to share equally in the educational and 
therapy and medical needs of the children under statute. 
24. Petitioner neither contributed to respondent's ability 
to earn nor help in schooling or training. 
25. Respondent sought, after termination from his job, to 
retroactively reduce the support obligation and he asks the court 
to do so now. The evidence before the court at the time of the 
commissioner's hearings justified the higher amount as the 
"termination" indeed appeared to be "self-inflicted" and 
purposeful. The court sees no basis in law, fact, or equity to 
retroactively reduce the amounts. Judgments were made on the 
available evidence and now that trial has occurred and fuller 
facts shown, as well as credibility determinations made, and the 
court finds and concludes no adjustment is needed retroactively. 
Respondent has made payments, and has failed to make payments. 
He is now in arrearages, through June 2010, since November 2009, 
in the sum of $9641 including child support and alimony. 
26. However, respondent in January 2010 was allowed to 
withdraw up to half his 401(k) to make those support payments. 
In fact that was done at the behest of petitioner. The 
withdrawal of those amounts have been subject to a tax 
consequence. At the time in January 2010 respondent had $49,903 
in his Wheeler retirement account and petitioner had $16,451 in 
her Discover 401)(k) account. Because the court has found 
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respondent did not "self-terminate" to avoid paying support, but 
has refused to retroactively reduce the support payment amounts, 
the court will require petitioner to participate equally in any 
tax liability from those withdrawals from the retirement fund. 
Even though respondent has been delinquent in paying the full 
amounts of support, the court believes this result is equitable. 
After the amounts withdrawn, which was approximately $25,000, the 
taxes were taken out and the actual amount received was $16,217. 
The remainder in respondent's retirement account and petitioner's 
account should be divided equally under a QDRO (roughly $25,000 + 
$16,000=$41,000 to be divided equally). The withdrawals did not 
in fact result in full payment being made by respondent, as he 
still is $9,641 behind as found. However, the withdrawal also 
did not result in the mortgage payments being made as the last 
full payment by respondent was made in December, the same month 
the mortgage payment was last made. The court does not find or 
attribute fault to either party for that fact. The simple fact 
is that on incomes as currently exists, not considering the 2007-
2009 incomes, a house payment of almost $2600 is almost 
impossible to maintain and the home was in trouble even if full 
payment had been made. 
27. In 2009 petitioner filed tax returns under the married 
but separately status, and took the children and mortgage 
interest as deductions, resulting in a refund from federal taxes 
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of $2998 and a state refund of $1136, or a total refund of $4134, 
half of which is $2067. The parties failed to communicate 
properly and this result followed. 
28. The parties are to share in any tax refund or liability 
but the better solution is for the parties to file an amended 
return and file married and jointly for 2009. The parties are to 
share equally and evenly in any tax owing or tax refund for 2009. 
The court is not certain it can order such an amendment but if it 
can it does. If it cannot, there is to be an equal sharing of tax 
liability or refund, but no doubt a liability for 2009 will occur 
for respondent with a high income and basically no deductions. 
In 2010 the parties may filed separate returns, petitioner taking 
the oldest child as a deduction and respondent the younger child. 
They are to alternate years thereafter. 
29. As found, the home is "upside down'' and must either be 
refinanced, sold short or foreclosed, with no payments having 
been made since December 2009. Given the amounts found herein, 
it is the court's belief that a loan modification will not likely 
occur, given petitioner's income, the lower amount of alimony 
awarded and child support and an amount due of approximately 
$360,000 plus amounts in arrears of over $16,000 not paid since 
December 2009, which amount must be added to that $360,000. If 
petitioner can refinance, the home is awarded to petitioner with 
all its debt holding respondent harmless. If she cannot, any 
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loss from a short sale or foreclosure is to be shared equally and 
any income tax consequence and liability are to be borne equally 
as well. 
30. During the marriage before job termination, respondent 
withheld $14,000 in cash from his direct deposit pay. 
Petitioner, upon realizing that, also took funds from the marital 
accounts. The court finds all accounts, even though in perhaps 
one name, were marital property as having been composed of 
earnings which were co-mingled. Petitioner became nervous and 
withdrew funds, but returned all but $2000 of those marital 
funds. Her candor about some of those transfers is not high in 
the court's opinion, but the court finds that the sum of $14,000 
of marital property was withheld by respondent and $2000 was 
withheld by petitioner. Thus, each is entitled to $6000. 
Respondent claimed that petitioner actually took $9000 of that 
$14,000 from his truck but the court finds otherwise, that such 
an event did not happen. The court simply cannot credit the 
testimony of respondent that he drove around in a business truck 
with $14,000 in cash in the visor of that truck for some months. 
Further, a transcript of a recorded telephone call in October 
2009 was received in which respondent admitted he had lost the 
money gambling. 
31. The parties met for a period after separation and "got 
along'' and divided the personal property. They seem now to have 
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moved away from the "getting along'' period and now disagree--
petitioner claims she is entitled to the timeshare because 
respondent took his tools of the trade, a tool box full of tools. 
At the time he was not utilizing those tools as he was working as 
a PSSR and not a mechanic. Based on that the court finds there 
was an agreement that respondent take his tools and petitioner 
would be entitled to maintain the time share with "RDI." That 
timeshare cost approximately $6500 and has a yearly fees 
associated. The tools are worth $8-10,000. The court awards 
petitioner the timeshare and its indebtedness and respondent is 
not entitled to its use, and if sold, to any proceeds, nor is he 
required to pay any fees. The tools belong to respondent. 
32. The parties also disagree on three firearms that were in 
the home. Respondent claims he did not take them and does not 
have them and petitioner claims the three guns are not in the 
home and respondent took them. The court has a hard time 
determining credibility on this issue and will not make a finding 
based on general credibility findings. IF the firearms are in 
the marital home, they should be returned to respondent. A 
neutral person agreeable to each party shall, with petitioner, go 
through the marital home within 5 days of this decision to look 
for such and if they are located they are to be returned to 
respondent, assuming he is not in any way restricted from their 
possession. If such firearms are not located, no further 
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findings are issued on the firearms. 
34. Each party is entitled to maintain the current vehicle 
in their possession. Petitioner has a 2007 Mazda and respondent 
a 2006 Chevrolet truck. Each is to maintain that vehicle, each 
having an approximately equal value, together with the 
indebtedness thereon. 
35. Petitioner has a life insurance policy with a cash value 
of $3564 and respondent has a similar life insurance policy with 
a cash value of $3733. Each is to maintain the policy each owns. 
36. In this action to establish alimony and child support, 
the court finds and concludes under UCA 30-3-5 that neither is 
able to assist the other in payment of attorney fees. Each is 
responsible for their own costs and attorney fees. 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The parties are within the jurisdiction of the court. 
2. Respondent is to pay child support under the tables with 
the above incomes being utilized. 
3. Respondent is to pay $900 per month alimony terminable on 
the usual triggers. 
4. There should be no retroactive adjustment to the support 
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ordered October 30, 2009. 
5. The tax liabilities should be disposed of as found above. 
6. The home should be awarded to petitioner if she can 
obtain a loan modification and respondent held harmless, but it 
is likely that the home will be sold or foreclosed, and the 
parties shall share equally in any loss and tax consequences. 
7. The personal property shall be divided as found above. 
8. The retirement funds shall be divided as found and 
discussed and the tax liabilities imposed. 
9. The amounts underpaid and withheld shall be offset as 
discussed above and judgment entered for those amounts. 
10. Each party shall bear their own fees. 
Respondent is to prepare a supplemental decree in 
compliance with URCP, Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. THIS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION IS HEREBY INCORPORATED INTO THE FINAL 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE AND IS CONSIDERED PART OF THE COURT'S ORDER. 
DATED this / day of 
1-
BRUCE: C. LDBECK '. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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ADDENDUM EX. 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIST^^^f^^ 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, ~~ ^ <^ ^c 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
CINDI MCPHERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GORDON w. MCPHERSON, 
Respondent. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 094401941 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: August 4, 2010 
The above matter came before the court for decision on 
Respondent's Motion to Amend Findings. 
Respondent filed the motion July 8, 2010, after a trial was 
held June 25 and 30, 2010, and after the court issued its 
memorandum decision July 1, 2010. Petitioner filed a response on 
July 12, 2010. Respondent filed a reply on July 15, 2010, and a 
request to submit the same date. 
The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the 
entire file, and concludes as follows. The court does not believe 
oral argument would be of benefit to the court. The court tried 
the case, maintained its notes and exhibits, and is fully 
advised. 
DISCUSSION 
Petitioner claims the court needs to modify its findings as 
0GC0369 
to alimony and as to money allegedly taken by petitioner. 
The court agrees that it should re-examine some its 
findings. The court failed to properly calculate the amount of 
child support in its own mind. The court found the gross income 
as in the memorandum decision paragraphs 8, 16 and 17, though the 
court erroneously in paragraph 16 attributed to respondent rather 
than petitioner the income of $3317 per month. However, the court 
in its own mind mis-calculated the child support on those figures 
and thus did not properly calculate the alimony amount. 
Based on the motion, the court has now re-examined all of 
its findings as to income and reasonable needs. This was a long 
term marriage and petitioner has custody of the two children. 
However, respondent is certainly correct. The court did not 
specifically find that respondent could pay $900 per month given 
his expenses though that was clearly inherent m the court's 
findings and discussion. Again, however, that was based on the 
court's own error m determining for its own purposes the amount 
of child support. 
The court therefore modifies the memorandum decision 
findings as follows: 
In paragraph 20, the court now determines that respondent's 
reasonable expenses are $2855 rather than $3155. The court 
reduces, m addition to those reductions in the memorandum 
decision, the areas of clothing (-50), entertainment (additional 
-50), and auto expense (additional -100). Thus, the court finds 
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respondent's reasonable expenses are $2955. 
In paragraph 22 the court finds that given petitioner's 
expenses and respondent's expenses and their incomes, and the 
needs of petitioner and respondent's ability to pay, respondent 
is able to pay the sum of $800 per month alimony. Given his 
income of $4680, minus the child support of $851 is $3829, minus 
his reasonable living expenses now found at $2955, he is able to 
pay $800 per month as alimony as he has over $800 remaining with 
which to pay petitioner alimony. 
Again, all this is tempered by the equitable consideration 
that while the court has found respondent is now earning this 
sum, his past indicates he is clearly able to earn more and that 
eventuality is not foreclosed by his present employment. 
The court is unwilling to make any changes in the claim of a 
withdrawal of $9500 by petitioner. The court did consider the 
testimony in paragraph 30 and it remains. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required other than the preparation of the decree as 
previously ordered, incorporating these changes and 
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modifications. 
DATED th is JJ_ day of MJ// 
, 2010, 
BRUCE C\ LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGED 
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